IX -- [March 9, 1903] 

IN THE BALKANS

50,000 MACEDONIANS READY TO RISE

WILL THE REFORMS BE ACCEPTED?

A POSSIBLE ARMED TRUCE

Salonica (Macedonia) March 3.

A diplomatist of my acquaintance in this town compares the Macedonian question to the Cretan labyrinth. His fellow-diplomatist objects that a Macedonian Adiadne has yet to be discovered. A third critic compares the Macedonian question to the Gordian Knot. That is right, remarks a fourth, for the sword alone can undo it. His dreary forecast is unaffected by the acceptance of the Russo-Austrian project, the chief provisions of which have now been announced in the newspapers.

To have recourse, once more, to figurative speech. Many of the experienced people who have favored me with their opinion--and especially those among them who are disposed to assume the attitude of apologists for the Turk--are so intent upon the trees that they fail to see the wood. They lose themselves in the confusion of detail. And so it often happens that this or that fact, adduced as an argument in favour of the Turk, may as easily be turned into an argument against him. Behind the seemingly inextricable tangle of detail, one fact--the all-important fact, beside which all others appear insignificant--stands out clearly; the utter helplessness and hopelessness of the Turkish Government, as it has hitherto existed, in Macedonia. Let it be granted that the recent stories of Turkish atrocities have in a great many points been grossly exaggerated (I know they have been), or that many of them are false (I know that, too), and that the insurgent bands have often plundered and killed even their own fellow-Christians, that some deeds of violence attributed to the Turks have been committed by the "komitadjis" (members of the insurgent bands); let it be admitted, for argument's sake that the insurrection, instead of being home-grown, is manufactured in Sofia, and the insurgent bands are insignificant in numbers (counting, according to a high authority, no more than three hundred men), the dominant fact remains unshaken that the fabric of the Ottoman Government in this province is crumbling to pieces, with threatenings of ruin to what remains of the Empire in Europe, of massacres in Macedonia, and of international troubles outside it.

TYPICAL STORIES

Let us glance at the foregoing admissions, made more or less for argument's sake. There have been exaggerations; there have been false statements. But only in hearsay evidence. Not a single member of the Consular body, whether in Bulgaria or in Macedonia, has rejected the testimony of fugitives as regards their own personal sufferings. But without any adventitious propping of hearsay atrocities, these sufferings are in themselves a sufficient indictment against the sort of government under which they were possible. A story may be terribly significant, even if it be an invention. In a recent letter I reproduced the substance of a story of the slaughter of Nicola and his uncle Ivan by Koletz, the Albanian brigand. Koletz, it is said, cut the two to pieces, and divided the fragments among his followers. The narrative may have been exaggerated; or it may have been an invention; but the narrators, and all their fellow countrymen and countrywomen who have repeated it, regard a murder even of that atrocious sort as a matter-of-fact affair--like the weather; as quite a natural event, if hard upon the victims and deplored by their relatives; as one which may just as naturally, in the way of revenge, be imitated by the other side. Even if exaggerated, or false, in detail, a story of this kind must not be rejected as wholly valueless, for it bears the "form and pressure" of the society wherein it has had its birth. Some few narratives, among the scores related to me by the fugitives in Bulgaria, were of this description. I reproduced them, for reasons which I hope I have now made clear.

In the next place, the attribution of such great influence to small, scattered bands of "brigands" amounts to a condemnation of the Government itself. If the brigands are so insignificant in numbers, why cannot the Government put them down? That the "brigands," otherwise the "bands," have on many occasions treated their fellow Christians as ruthlessly as the Turks have done, is beyond doubt. I have this moment read a message from one of the Vice-Consuls in the interior, which states that a band of seven "komitadjis" have killed a Pope Nicola, because of his refusal to transfer his ecclesiastical allegiance from the Greek Patriarch to the Bulgarian Exarch. The message also states that Pope Nicola has been slain with the connivance of the Exarchist schoolmaster, whose guest he was. Now I have reasons for doubting the accuracy of this story as it stands. If Pope Nicola has been assassinated, it is extremely probable that he was convicted of being an informer. It is the invariable practice of the Committee-men, whether absent with the bands or engaged at home in their ordinary occupations, to warn any person suspected of giving information to the Turkish authorities. Death is the certain punishment of the convicted informer, man or woman.

BRIGANDS AND KOMITADJIS

Since Saraffof's "reign of terror," acts of lawlessness by the bands have come much less frequent; informers are almost always the victims. The revolutionary bands are the natural off-spring of a corrupt and corrupting form of government. The extermination of the "komitadjis" (men of the revolutionary committees) would not arrest the administrative abuses that account for them. Moreover, the name brigands is inexact. Neither is every brigand a "komitadji," nor every "komitadji" a brigand. They differ as thief from political outlaw.

But, as already said, one or two of the foregoing admissions have been made for argument's sake only. The statement that the insurrection--with its "komitadji" bands--is directed from a foreign country, Bulgaria, I have dealt with in former letters. It is still believed in by officials in Salonica, Turkish, English, French, German, Italian, and the rest. The Sofian Committees sympathise with the Macedonian insurgents, and help the, as far as they can do so within "constitutional" limits. It is more than likely that sometimes they exceed the limits. But the point is this--that the Macedonian movement would proceed unimpeded if the Bulgarian Committees were extinct tomorrow.

In the next place, the estimate made by the Consular body here in Salonica, that the Macedonian bands count no more than three hundred men all told, is probably correct. But which three hundred? The three hundred who are out this week will be at their homes next week, when they will be replaced by others. What do they go out for? To Smuggle arms across the frontier, to distribute and collect information, to strengthen weaker centres, to prepare the whole of Macedonia for a simultaneous rising, by preconcerted signal, if the plans of reform should fail, and the worst come to the worst.

TRAINING THE BANDS

The band is also regarded by its leaders and by all the Macedonian population who support the movement, morally or materially, as a school of discipline. Services in a band, especially during the winter months, has inured its members to the severest hardships. At all times it calls into play their faculties of observation, and trains them in habits of self-reliance. A young Macedonian is a better man, physically at least, after a few weeks' experience with a band than before it. And discipline being a chief end of a Macedonian band, each band always contains a number of seasoned members for the guidance of the new comers. Thousands of Macedonians have passed through these bands; so that they are fairly well prepared for the months, and, perhaps, years of guerilla warfare which some of the leaders believe to be in store for them.

 Nevertheless, the importance even of these bands must not be overrated. The more than fifty conflicts they have had with the Turks during the last year are but the sporadic outbursts of a volcano. So also were the vents of the "black week" of November-December last, when the search for arms in the districts of the northern frontier led to atrocious deeds of which you have already heard quite enough. These conflicts, these other deplorable deeds, are the occasional volcanic spurts of which the sensation-mongers of the Press made the most, "piling up the agony," as they say. They are but symptoms of a subterranean, fiery flood that some day may overflow. In talking about the three hundred "Komitadjis" who are constantly on the move, people forget the multitudes who, though indistinguishable from their fellow-subjects in the villages, and in the streets of the large towns, have their weapons in readiness. In Bulgaria I was assured that there were at the very least forty thousand of them. A similar estimate has been given to me by men in Macedonia who are, or should be, able to make a good guess. In Macedonia there are over four thousand three hundred villages, from which the leaders of the revolutionary organization expect an average contribution of ten men each. I know of a small town, not far from the northern frontier, where the "Komitadjis" are confident of mustering nearly a thousand men, and twice as many from the surrounding district.

Here is another estimate. In Macedonia there are more than a hundred and sixty thousand Bulgarian houses. If only one house in every three supplied a "Committee-man," there would be fifty thousand Macedonians ready for insurrection. The number of Bulgarian houses in Macedonia rather exceeds that of the Turkish, Orthodox, Serbian, Rumanian houses put together. For the present the organization is merely precautionary. The "Komitadjis" have stringent orders never to fight except in self-defence. Let an honest attempt be made immediately, and on a sufficiently comprehensive scale, to reform the government, and the Komitadji's occupation will be gone in a day.

POSSIBLE ARMED TRUCE

Even at this early stage, I may venture to say what general impression the Russo-Austrian Note has produced upon the leaders of the revolutionary movement and their followers. They would be honestly disposed to give the proposed scheme a trial--provided it were put in force without delay, and provided it were strengthened in such a manner as to bring the financial and judicial departments under the supervision of European officers responsible to the Powers. On the side of the Macedonian organization, the attitude would be that of a truce--an armed truce--to be followed by permanent peace, if the new administrative experiment should prove fairly successful. While declaring autonomy to be the ultimate solution of the Macedonian question, the leaders of the movement believe that with the co-operation of Europe--and not least with the moral support of England--the essential benefits of autonomy may in the interval be attained to an extent sufficiently liberal to pacify the country. Autonomy, say they, is itself but a means to an end, the end of security for life and property--which signifies unbought justice, freedom from capricious imprisonment, from capricious taxation, from the agent provocateur, payment for one's labor, the universal reign of law.

An influential member of the revolutionary organization tells me, "If the Russo-Austrian plan could be made to guarantee to us all this, our agitation would cease. But, according to the new scheme, it would appear that the only European officers to be appointed are destined for the Police, and that even these will really be under the Sultan's personal control. The plan of tax-collection by the villagers themselves is excellent in itself, but in a little while the Turkish local authority will regain its sway, and the administration of the villages will go on as before. In order that a scheme of reforms shall be worth anything at all, the departments of Police, Finance, and Justice must be under responsible control of European officers, supported by the Powers."

This, I repeat, is what the revolutionary leaders tell me. I am simply putting their opinions and their declarations on record. The would, I believe, be satisfied with Sir Alfred Bilotti's scheme of European inspectorships in the financial, judicial, and police departments. In the British Consul-General's plan there occurs a suggestion which seems to indicate how some, at least, of the benefits to be expected from the institution of a responsible Governor-Generalship for all Macedonia might be obtained, even although, because of the Sultan's determined opposition, the old proposal of a Governor-General has been abandoned. According to Sir Alfred's plan, there should be three European inspectors for the valet of Salonica, three for the valet of Monastir, three for that of Cassava; nine for all Macedonia. In each of these three divisions of Macedonia, each of the three departments of Police, Finance, and Justice would be supervised by a European official. Sir Alfred suggests (unless I have misunderstood him) that the nice European officials, besides attending to the business of their respective divisions, might consult together respecting affairs common to the three.

THE CURSE OF THE TITHE

The British Consul-General lays particular stress upon the necessity for an immediate change in the system of collecting the so-called tithe, a tax which often absorbs, not the legal tenth, but six-tenths of the peasant's harvest. Payment of the tithe in kind has been a curse to everybody but the usurer. The Turkish Government puts up the tithes for sale, but at as late a date as possible in order that it may form some estimate of the value of the future harvest. Having bought the tithes, the tithe-farmer is free to squeeze as much as he can out of the cultivators. The squeezing can be effected in various ways. The cultivator can be made to postpone harvesting until the prospect of damage to his crops induces him to concede the extortioner's demands. Again, a large part of the State taxes is payable in May and July, so that the peasants must either borrow money at a high rate of interest or sell their unreaped harvest of August at low speculative rates. The barest statement of this abuse will give the reader some conception of the formidable, complicated character of the task which the European officials (if they are not to be mere dummies) will have to discharge. Money payments will have to be substituted for payments in kind; the pernicious old system, root and branch, must be abolished.

Another great difficulty presents itself in the evasion of tax payments by influential persons whom the local "defterdars" (treasurers) dare not displease. Evasions of this kind, while causing additional exactions from the poor, account to a considerable extent for provincial deficits. European officials alone can stop this form of swindling. Egypt has shown the world how with foreign help justice can be substituted for corruption. And if foreign officers have converted our undisciplined horde of Cretan into an excellent gendarmerie they can repeat the achievement in Macedonia. Under a civilized administration, Macedonia would not only pay her way, but also yield a good surplus to the Imperial treasury. The Turkish rulers of Macedonia say that if the gendarmes, troops, and other servants of the State were regularly paid the country's troubles would disappear. How, with any regard for logic, can the Government punish corruption in the servants whom by its neglect it forces to cheat and plunder for dear life's sake? This question was lately put to me by a highly-placed Turkish official.

AN OBSTINATE FIGHT

The announcement of the new plan of reform has done little or nothing to allay the popular dread of a coming insurrection. I am speaking of this large town of Salonica, with its hundred and twenty thousand inhabitants; and of the much smaller town of Serres, and its adjacent villages, in Eastern Macedonia, which I am to revisit immediately. A village near Seres is the scene of the latest conflict between the Turkish troops and the Macedonian bandmen. It has been an obstinate fight. The bandmen, though greatly outnumbered, have escaped. At this moment they are dispersing all over the country, and the Turkish troops are returning to Serres. Here are the facts. A small band of seven, detached from a larger body, stopped the other day at the village of Vrodi, where they were received by members of the organization. Their presence was discovered by a Greek, who paid their domicile a visit, under the pretence of his business as a tax collector. He sent word to the military authorities at Serres. A hundred infantry and forty horsemen were dispatched to the village. The house was besieged. After some fighting, the band, making a breach in the partition wall, retreated to the adjoining house, the occupants of which also were in the insurrectionary movement. In the same way, they effected their retreat through several houses. Twelve houses, and eight other buildings (barns and stables) have been burnt by the Turks, a few of whom have been killed and wounded. If the suspected Greek be--as I am told he is--the informer, the sooner he clears out of Vrodi village, the better for him. Sooner or later the bandsman's knife or bullet will make an end of him.

As I pointed out in a former letter, the patriotic movement in Macedonia has its dark side. All patriotic insurrections have had it. In the very air of Salonica one detects a subtle something or other, as of suspicion and fear.

Shopkeepers, hotel keepers, are in dread of coming massacre. From missionaries in the interior come warnings of approaching trouble. The Turkish part of the population is in no way pleased by the Sultan's order for the immediate liberation of some three thousand Bulgar-Macedonian prisoners in the gaols of Macedonia. Most of these prisoners are political suspects. Numbers of them have been in prison awaiting trial for many months. The bandmen are rejoicing at this gaol delivery, for it means an accession to their ranks. Never is the presentiment of failure absent in the discussions to which the Austro-Russian scheme has given rise among the foreign residents of Salonica. The new reforms, it is often said, are meant to be nothing more than a temporary makeshift, which will have served its purpose when one of the two Powers is ready for its next advance upon the Bosphorus, and the other is ready to turn Salonica into an Austrian Constantinople.